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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
F R A N C I S A. C U T L E R ,
Plaintiff, I
D A L E B O W E N and S A L T L A K E
CITY RELOCATION AGENCY,

[ Case No.
I 13554
\

Defendants.

Brief of Defendant and Appellant
Dale Bowen

N A T U R E O F T H E CASE
This is an action commenced by the plaintiff
against the defendant Dale Bowen to declare a business relationship to be a partnership and to recover
$5,000 paid out as "relocating moneys" paid in lieu
of moving and related expenses, together with $178.45
more in payment of inventory items claimed due plaintiff as defendant's partner.
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D I S P O S I T I O N OF T H E CASE BY T H E
L O W E R COURT
The lower court held the appellee is entiled to $4900
of the relocation money in savings, with accrued interest
thereon, plus an amount of $6.52, which was the balance of the $100 retained by the Relocation Agency
(to pay expenses accruing), plus a judgment of
$12407.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of the trial court's award of the savings
account, the check for $6.52 and the judgment of the
plaintiff, based on the court's conclusion that a partnership existed between the parties.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant owned and operated a Salt Lake
City beer tavern, the Havana Club; his manager, Pete
Kakunes, was quitting and he called the appellant at
his ranch in Idaho in June 1968 to so advise him and
to recommend the appellee as his successor. (R. 118B)
She was then a night bartender at the Havana Club.
(R-61, 79B) On June 20th 1968 the appellant returned to Salt Lake, met with Kakunes and with the
appellee (whether jointly or separately is in dispute),
concerning her succeeding Kakunes (who had purchased
a tavern of his own), as manager of the Havana Club.
(R. 63, 77B, 78B, 80B, 8lB, 90B, 9lB, 117B, 118B).
2
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Appellee accepted Mr. Bowen's offer to work as
his manager (appellee claims his offer was to make her
his partner). She contributed only her time and labor.
(R-64) She was to draw $100 per week and receive
y% of the profits each year, after all expenses were paid,
with appellant receiving a similar amount. (R-88,118B,
119B) Appellee was authorized by the appellant to
hire and fire, bank the moneys, pay the bills, and keep
the records for the accountant, Ronald Kingsbury. (R66, 121B, 156B) Appellant worked with her for two
or three days and then returned to Idaho, leaving her
to manage the club. (R-66, 67, 119B) There was no
writing concerning plaintiff's status. (R-89)
This arrangement continued up to and including
April 9th, 1972. However, in late 1971 the parties were
notified by the Salt Lake Relocation Agency that the
land the Havana Club was on was to be taken for the
new Salt Palace project, and said appellant would have
to relocate his business. (R-67, Exh. P-1) Appellant
sold his idaho property in late 1971 (R-117B) and
came back to his home in Salt Lake. In January or
February 1972, appellant with these sales funds, purchased a tavern, the Apex Bar, also in Salt Lake City,
and operated it. (R-95, 123B, 142B) It was comparable in size and operation to the Havana Club. (R-123)
H e hired another manager to operate this bar, without
objection from the appellee. (R-96, 97,124B)
The parties were given notice to vacate by midnight
April 25, 1972, and they closed the Havana Club on
April 9, 1972. (Exh. P-1, R-75) Meanwhile, the
3
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parties searched, without success, for another bar which
Mrs. Cutler was to manage for the appellant. One
prospective buy, the N.C. Bar, fell through when the
owners decided to keep it for their family, and no other
bar locations were found. (R-69, 70, 71, 72,125B, 126B,
117B).
The Re-Location Agency notified the parties that
the volume of business done by the Havana Club qualified it to receive the maximum relocation payment of
$10,000, provided certain other options were not exercised by the club. Appellant told the Relocation Agency that he would take the $10,000. (R-l 16) In April
1972 a check for $5,000 was prepared and delivered to
the appellant. (Exh. 10-D, R-75B) However, at the
request of the appellee to the Agency, both parties
names were put on the check, dated April 5, 1972. At
this time, the N.C. Bar purchase was still being negotiated ; Mr. Bowen requested Mrs. Cutler, the appellee,
to endorse the check, which she did. Appellant then
deposited the check in his personal account. (R-126B,
128B)
Before the second check, which was for $4,900
($100 was held out for incidental expenses payable)
was delivered, appellee had her attorney accompany her
and Mr. Bowen, the appellant, to the Relocating Agency to receive this check which was also made out in
both names. (R-146B, 147B) Mr. Bowen denied that
Mrs. Cutler was entitled to any part of the $10,000,
which was paid "in lieu of moving and related expenses". Mrs. Cutler told Mr. Bowen that she was his
4
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partner and that the $4,900 check was hers. Unable to
agree, the parties deposited this check in a joint savings
account, pending the outcome of this litigation (R-73,
74)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A P A Y M E N T "IN L I E U OF MOVING
A N D R E L A T E D E X P E N S E S " M A D E TO A N
O W N E R OF A BUSINESS W H O IS B E I N G
VACATED
AND DISPLACED
IS
NOT
MONEY T H A T SHOULD BE
SHARED
W I T H T H E " M A N A G E R " OR " M A N A G E R P A R T N E R " W H O H E L P S TO O P E R A T E H I S
BUSINESS.
In this operation of a tavern business, the appellee
contributed her time and efforts, nothing more. (R-64,
122B) The appellant owned the lease, the licenses, the
equipment, and the inventory. (R-122B, 133B, 146B,
149B) Exh. 17-D, consisting of three pages from the
Relocation Handbook of the Salt Lake Relocation Agency, sets out the pertinent data concerning the general
information and eligibility requirements to qualify for
"Payment In Lieu Of Moving and Related Expenses."
This was the $10,000 item being litigated in this lawsuit. The Director of the Relocation Agency, Mr.
Wright, stated that the information he had was that the
appellant was the owner and appellee was the manager
5
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of the Havana Club. When asked why the two checks
given in payment of the $10,000, were made to both
parties jointly, he didn't answer directly, but said they
could have "probably made it strictly to the Havana
Club". (R-117). On further questioning, Mr. Wright
said both parties were agreeable on the first check being
made out jointly. Appellant's attorney raised the point
that since appellant had acquired another property (the
Apex Bar) before the money was paid that there was
concern that none of the $10,000 could be paid. The
witness stated that the Denver regional office considered
the Apex Bar a replacement, even though acquired prior
to the actual moving, so there was no problem in making
the payment. (R-118). On cross-examination Mr.
Wright stated that Mrs. Cutler's name did not need to
be on the check in order for payment to be made, and
that appellants' acquiring the Apex Bar didn't in any
manner require her to be one of the payees. (R-119)
The reason appellee's name was on the two checks with
the appellant was because the appellee had so requested
it a number of times, and Mr. Bowen had voiced no
objection until after the second check had been issued.
Mr. Wright further stated that this $10,000, is not reportable as income, nor taxable as income. (R-120)
Whatever relationship existed here between the
parties, it terminated at the close of business on April
9,1972 when the Havana Club quit business. (R-145B,
146B)
On an accounting basis, assuming there was a partnership, each partner should have received back what
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each contributed, and after payment of bills, the moneys
in the cash register, the safe and the bank should have
been equally divided, per their agreement. This was
done.
The appellant, Mr. Bowen, had contributed the
premises, the lease, licenses, equipment, inventory and
a going business when Mrs. Cutler changed from being
his night bartender to manager (or partner, for the
sake of argument at this point). However, the licenses,
equipment and inventory were all he salvaged from
having to relocate. The $10,000 payment to him was to
help make him "whole".
The appellee, Mrs. Cutler, received back what she
contributed, her time and talents. She had not requested
that her job be continued elsewhere by Mr. Bowen.
(R-146B)
The wages due and profits remaining were equally
divided between her and him on April 10, 1972, the day
after the business closed. (R-131B)
The relocation expenses of $10,000 were to make
up for "a substantial loss of (its) existing patronage,
which business contributed materially to the income of
the "displaced owner" (emphasis ours), together with
the actual cost of moving, and related expenses. (Exh.
17-D) All Mrs. Cutler had, or claimed, was one half
of the "cash register" of the business, in addition to
her $100 per week draw. (R-88, 118B, 119B)
The appellee terminated her relationship with Mr.
Bowen when she didn't continue working for him, either
7
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at the Apex or elsewhere, especially if she were a partner. If she weren't a partner, she certainly had no
claim to a part of the $10,000. If she were a partner
as to the profits of the business, which is all that she
claimed to be, repeatedly, that is all that she is entitled
to participate in. Profits are reportable and taxable, as
income. Moneys paid in lieu of expenses to relocate,
as here, are not.
The appellee breached the whole concept of relocating by not insisting to appellant Bowen that she
was entitled to her job with him now that he had relocated in the Apex, or place her in some other club,
since she needed, and was entitled to, her job. Appellee
had no interest in, nor was she entitled to anything but
the profits from the business. However, the trial court
awarded her the second check of $4,900 being held presently in a joint savings account by the parties.
In summary, appellee admittedly had no interest in
the physical properties making up the business, nor the
lease, nor licenses. By awarding her the second check
amounting to $4,900, the court, in effect, gave her an
interest in these items, and made it retroactive, contrary
to her own testimony.
In further summary, the Havana Bar was re-located at the Apex Bar on the basis of this $10,000
which was granted and needed to move and to re-stablish a good business of customers and patrons. The
appellee, Mrs. Cutler, did not continue for Mr. Bowen
as manager (or partner) of the bar. Therefore, the
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manager job (or partnership) was dissolved. And the
relocation money could in no way be construed to be an
asset in April 1972. I t had, in effect, been spent when
the re-location was made to the Apex Bar two or three
months earlier.
POINT II
T H E I N T E N T I O N OF T H E P A R T I E S IS
DECISIVE IN DETERMINING T H E EXISTENCE OF A P A R T N E R S H I P ; W H E R E IT IS
C L E A R L Y O N E O F E M P L O Y M E N T , NO
P A R T N E R S H I P W I L L BE FOUND.
Numerous cases hold that the intention of the
parties to be partners, with mutual consent evident,
must be manifested by the terms of their agreement,
their contract toward each other, or by the surrounding
circumstances of the transaction in question. Burnett
v. Lemon, 185 Or. 54, 199 P2d 910; Leeds v. Townsend, 228 111 451, 81 N E 1069; Porter v. Moore, 130
Mont. 259; 300 P2d 513. Tripp V. Ghubb, 69 Ariz. 81,
208 P2d 312; Eardley v. Sammons, 8 Ut 2d 159, 330
P2d 122; Benson v. Rozelle, 85 Ut. 582, 39 P2d 1113.
59 Am. Jur. 2d 961, 962, 979.
The mere fact that the parties call themselves partners, or refer to their business relation as a partnership will not necessarily make them partners, nor their
business a partnership. Bradbury v. Nagelhus, 132
Mont 417, 319 P2d 503; Cruickshank v. Lid, 158
Wash. 523, 291 P 485; Wagner v. Buttles, 151 Wis.
668,139 N.W. 425.
9
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A recent Arizona case involved a man and woman,
who had lived together and operated various liquor
establishments both before and during marriage. The
trial court held that they had not intended to operate
the businesses as partners, or that the property, which
was held by the wife in her name alone, would be held
as community property. I t is Myrland v. Myrland, 19
Ariz. App. 498; 508 P2d 757.
Some aspects of this case are similar to this one
between Mrs. Cutler and Mrs. Bowen. The man, an
employee manager, claimed the partnership existed.
Mr. Myrland began work as a bartender in 1942,
but also supervised some remodeling, all of which the
owner, a Mrs. Lester paid for. Shortly thereafter, according to Mr. Myrland, they agreed to jointly operate
a tavern for profit. H e then worked on an hourly basis
and was paid in cash. In 1947, Mr. Myrland, at Mrs.
Lester's request, moved in with her. They sold the
tavern and built a new one partly from the earnings of
the tavern which they had sold. The appellant assisted
Mrs. Lester in numerous ways in the construction of
the new building, and, being a disbarred lawyer, was
conversant with business transactions. A year later,
Mrs. Lester sold the new Bar and leased the premises.
For two years they lived on the proceeds from the sale
and the rental income, and then Mrs. Lester purchased
some more property, a bar business, which they operated, and devoted substantially all their time to its
operation. I n 1951 Arizona condemned part of Mrs.
Lester's property and she received $17,000, which was
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

paid on the mortgage on the property. The next year
these two were married. In 1966, another State condemnation action was started on the same property;
Mrs. Myrland received $51,000; she was also receiving
more than one thousand dollars per month in rentals.
She had $82,000 in various banks; $15,000 of it was in
a joint account with Mr. Myrland. The question of
partnership then arose when marital troubles started.
Appellant had control over the moneys, could take advances, and did so. However, the court held, in the last
analysis, that facts, circumstances, and "most important", the intention of the parties control.
The court held that "a participation in profits does
not necessarily constitute the recipient a legally responsible partner, in the absence of such fundamental
requisites as intention, co-ownership of the business,
community of interest, and community of power in administration." The needed intent to form a partnership
was lacking, particularly where the wife controlled her
property and income and denied any intent to form a
partnership agreement. "One cannot make a leap; from
a special or unusual financial and social relationship
and convert it into a legal partnership, where certain
critical indicia are absent", the court stated, in reaffirming the lower court's decision.
The appellant here, Dale Bowen, had previously
hired managers for various clubs which he operated, and
had been in at least one partnership. H e stated that
Kakunes had been his manager at the Havana Club
until he left, and he presently had a manager at the
11
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Apex. The appellee testified that she had owned two
taverns, and had bought out a partner in one of them,
had "run" another tavern and had also worked for Pete
Kakunes at the Round-Up before coming to the H a vana, she said. (R-60,116B, 117B). However, appellee,
although having worked five months or more for Mr.
Kakunes in 1968 at the Havana Club, before taking
over as manager, did not know whether he was a manager or partner there. She denied that he asked her if
she was interested in becoming manager of the Havana,
but quoted him as saying, "there might be a good job
for me if I played my cards right . . ." (R-87, 88).
Mrs. Cutler, the appellee, testified that she claimed
no interest in the inventory or personal property at the
Havana Club but wanted the profit from the business,
"split halfway down on everything". (R-66B)
The public accountant, Ronald L. Kingsbury,
called as a witness by the appellee, testified that the
club's books were to be set up as a partnership, "on the
basis of Mrs. Cutler being manager". (R-49). However, on cross-examination, the witness testified that
appellee was not actually to be a partner, but a manager, and was to get her compensation from the business. The witness further admitted, on cross examination, that although the state and federal tax forms,
most of them at least, were set up showing a partnership, that Form 1065, the federal partnership form, was
the only one available for use where there was a division of profits between individuals. (R-107-110)
12
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The only other witness for the appellee, Mr.
Wright, of the Salt Lake Relocation Agency, as previously mentioned under Point I, of this brief, testified
on direct examination that Mr. Bowen was the owner
and Mrs. Cutler was the manager (R-116). H e further
testified, when cross-examined, that there was no need
for Mrs. Cutler's name to be on the checks, totally
$10,000, and that there was no problem arising from
the fact that Mr. Bowen had found and purchased another beer tavern in January or February before the
April closing of the Havana Club, although Mrs. Cutler had told Mr. Bowen that there would be unless her
name was also put on the check. (R-118,119)
None of the employees who worked at the Havana
Club between 1968 and 1972, while Mrs. Cutler was
either manager or partner, were called by her to testify
that she had told them, by words, acts, or conduct that
she was more than a manager, and was, namely a partner of Dale Bowen. (R-58, 61B)
In the closing moments of the trial, the appellee
did ask to have one witness to testify that Mr. Bowen
had introduced Mrs. Cutler as his partner.
Counsel for Mr. Bowen stipulated that appellant
"may have introduced her as a partner to someone
sometime". The stipulation was accepted and the trial
was concluded. (R-162B)
Aside from the above summary, no one, except the
appellee, with her uncorroborated testimony, presented
any evidence of a partnership existing here during the
13
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nearly four years of operation. Only when advised by
the Salt Lake Relocation Agency that an amount up
to $10,000 was available for moving and relocating expenses, did the manager decide to include herself in as
a full partner. In effect, she leap-frogged herself,
(after only five months of employment) from night
bar tender to partner and co-owner of an established
tavern business.
None of the four witnesses for the appellant,
messrs Kakunes, Jones, Allen or Sisneros testified,
either on direct or cross-examination, that the appellee
was a partner with the appellant, Dale Bowen. All
four had been, or were, full or part-time employees at
the Havana Club while the appellee, Francis Cutler,
was there as manager, except for Mr. Kakunes, who
left after he obtained the job for her from Mr. Bowen.
(R-77,79, 92,104, 113).

A former employee, Jack Allen, testified, as did
Mr. Sisneros, a part-time employee at the Apex, that
they had re-paid to the appellee loans made by the club
to them shortly before, or at the time, the Havana Club
closed. None of these were reported collected by the
appellee to the appellant. She maintained that no
I.O.U.s were paid after the Havana Club closed. Mr.
Allen had borrowed some moneys from the Havana
Club, through the appellee, in the spring of 1972 and
had repaid all but $20. H e testified that in the fall of
the year of 1972 that Mrs. Cutler asked him to pay it
and he subsequently met her at the Broadway Lounge
one morning at 9 o'clock paid her $20, and she gave
14
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him the I.O.U. H e said he was working at the Los
Angeles Bar at the time. (R-99B, 103B, 104B)
Mr. Sisneros testified that he was a regular borrower from the Havana Club, where he was also employed. His disability check came the first part of each
month, he said; in April 1972 he repaid the obligation
due, and just before the club closed on April 9th he
asked Mrs. Cutler for $70, for rent, which she gave
him. H e testified that he repaid the $70 the first of
May 1972 to Mrs. Cutler at the "73" Club. (R-108B,
111B, 112B, 113B, 114B)
These two witnesses, Allen and Sisneros, seemed
fiercely proud, as they testified, concerning their trustworthiness in repayment of the funds borrowed at the
time and place indicated. Appellee's counsel could not
confuse them nor get them to vary their testimony in
this regard. Appellee denied that Allen had borrowed
from the club, stating that it was her personal money,
and that he had repaid her. She claimed Sisneros repaid his loan immediately after the club closed, contrary to his recollection and testimony. (R-158, 159B)
Concerning the creation of this business relationship, the appellant, Kakunes, (the manager who was
quitting) and Orville Jones, the afternoon bartender
on duty, each testified that there was a three way meeting on June 20, 1968 between the appellee, Kakunes,
and the appellant, at least for the initial part of the
discussion. (R-78B, 79B, 9lB)
Mrs. Cutler testified that only she and the appel15
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lant met and talked and that he had offered her a partnership. (R-63) She further stated, on cross examination that, as a partner, she would work as often as she
wanted to. (R 88) Appellee received a draw of $100
per week, whether the business warranted it or not,
which would indicate she was not to participate in any
losses the business incurred. (R-118B) When the H a vana closed, appellee asked for an accounting only on
the moneys received from the operation of the business,
(plus y% of the relocation moneys) and cared nothing
of the sale or disposition of the equipment or inventory
of the business. (R-98, 99,100)
Although the appellee testified that she had owned
and operated bars, she displayed a lack of business
knowledge when she ignored the club's monthly bank
statements, and relied, instead, on her own check stub
accounting. When the club closed, appellee informed
appellant that there was $849.70 in the bank which,
after the bills were paid, would leave $154.55 balance
to divide. The bank statements showed in excess of
$2,000 in the account for the end of March and April
1972. On May 16, 1972 after he had received several
unpaid Havana Club bills, appellant was advised, in
writing, by the bank that there was $2267.85 in the
checking account (Exh. 11-D, R-97, 98). Appellee
stated she made no further bank deposits after the club
closed on April 9th, and could not explain the difference of $1,418.15. Thereupon, on May 19, 1972, Mr.
Bowen testified that he withdrew $1537.79 of the funds,
of which $850.00 was for unpaid bills, and $687.79 was
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one half of the remainder. A like sum was left for Mrs.
Cutler, which she withdrew on June 6th, 1972, thus
closing the Havana Club checking account. Mr. Bowen
explained his opinion of the difference by stating that
he believed that appellee was out to cheat him. (R-131B,
132B, 133B).
There was also testimony by the appellant, on
cross-examination, that he had every intention to acquire a bar to have the appellee operate for him. However, when he found out, in late March or early April
1972, that she was claiming one-half of the relocation
money, he lost his enthusiasm to find another bar. (R143B, 147B). H e further stated that when he requested
Mr. Kingsbury, their public accountant, to set up the
books for the club, he never told him to indicate that
appellee was a partner, but relied on his experience as
an accountant. This was one more indication that there
was no intention by the owner of the Havana club to
make appellee his partner.
The partnership statutes of Utah which are meaningful in this fact situation are 48-1-1, 48-1-3 and 481-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953.

CONCLUSION
I t is respectfully submitted that the trial court was
in error when it held that the facts and the evidence
were sufficient to find there was a partnership here.
Appellant urges this court to hold, as a matter of law,
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that no partnership existed, and the relationship here
was that of employer and manager.
However, even if a partnership were held to exist,
it should only be a partnership as to the income of the
business, which were the "cash register" profits, and did
not pertain to the relocation moneys, which were paid
by the government Agency to move and to re-establish
the appellant owner in a new business location.
Respectfully submitted,
M E R R I L L K. D A V I S
Suite 320, 72 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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